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Abstract 
 
 
This paper contrasts the old "crowd" of the revered urban proletariat from the days of Mao 
Zedong to the new "crowd" of laid-off workers.  It utilizes concepts from the book, CROWDS 
AND POWER, by Elias Canetti, to characterize the opposed characteristics of the two crowds, 
and details the plight of the current crowd, as well as highlighting some continuities in the 
behavior and treatment of the working class by the regime.  It also provides some statistics on 
unemployment, reemployment, benefits, and poverty among the old working class, and shows 
how its members have become informal workers. 
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3Along the streets of Chinese inland cities these days, the service sector, starved nearly to death 
until the early 1980's, seems full of life, packed with business, its practitioners a literal crowd.  
You can get your shoes shined for two yuan1 by three different peddlers on just one block, buy 
the same pair of nylons for the same 10 yuan five or six times or the same ballpoint pen for two 
or three yuan in the same lane.  Or you can choose any one of 10 pedicabs to deliver you as far as 
a couple of miles away, for as little as a piddling three to five yuan.   
 
Besides such self-employed city folk, others among these millions of sorry, suddenly informal2 
urban laborers work for wages.  One of my Wuhan informants was a woman who, first let go by 
her own firm, had later been dismissed from a private enterprise when its business deteriorated, 
and was currently dishwashing at a restaurant for 12 hours per day for 300 yuan a month, 
equivalent to some just over three-quarters of a British pound per day.  Another, on her third 
post-enterprise position, was charged with simply standing at the gates of the idle plant where she 
had once been gainfully, purposefully employed.  A third woman did housework when contacted 
by the Women's Federation, which could be as rarely as just once a month.  When she did get this 
very temporary employment, she was paid by the hour, at the measly rate of 3.2 yuan.3 
 
A trade union study found that 48.7 percent of the "reemployed" it counted were self-employed, 
while of the other 51.3 percent who had been hired, well over half (59 percent) were engaged in 
work that was only temporary.4  People doing this second type of informal work are described in 
a set of sobering vignettes that graced the pages of the local newspaper in the central China city 
of Wuhan in early summer 1998, as the numbers of those making up the new informal class of 
furloughed workers mounted steadily: 
 
Now in a lot of units there's irregular use of labor, obstructing the [laid-off] staff and workers' 
reemployment..The textile trade's reemployment service center is entrusted with 10,000 laid-off 
staff and workers, of whom about 400 have become reemployed..not one of the 100 units that 
hired them has taken over social security reponsibilities for them or signed a formal contract. 
 
4Three hired as transport workers for a store's household appliance department were paid only 200 
yuan after a month, while the store's regular workers' monthly income averaged more than 1,000 
yuan.     
 
According to relevant regulations, staff and workers have a three month-probation period, in 
which wages are rather low.  But after the three months a clothing enterprise fired those it had 
taken on.  Of all those placed out of the [reemployment] service center, 44 percent of the total 
were soon fired for reasons that had nothing to do with their job performances.5 
 
A sympathetic writer in a trade union journal worried thusly about the troubles of these workers: 
For a long time, they've been drifting outside the enterprise in a socially marginal situation, 
especially those in small-scale, scattered, mobile informal departments..They meet up with 
many problems and annoyances, but lack any organization's loving care, are without any 
opportunity to get education or to participate in society.6 
 
Another lamented that,"Some households in special difficulty suffer discrimination in trying to 
become reemployed." Going on, he called attention to the facts that, 
Their legal rights and interests are harmed arbitrarily by employers, and they are bearing 
economic, psychological and social burdens.  They feel lost and in a negative mood.  
Pessimistic and depressed, they're hopeless, lost their confidence...This is especially so for 
for those who had made a big contribution to their enterprises in the past...they feel 
abandoned by society.7 
 
Besides having to cope with the psychological shock of losing their jobs, those able to find work-
-the new informalites--are generally severely strapped financially.  In a 1997 investigation in 55 
cities across 17 different provinces, 1,300 returned questionnaires revealed that well over half (a 
full 58 percent) of the laid-off in the study were obtaining an income under 200 yuan per month.8  
In 1999, when the State Statistical Bureau announced that the average national wage of an on-
post urban state-owned unit worker averaged 695 yuan, only 12.6 percent of the total laid-off 
workers (as far as was known to official statisticians) had an income over 500 yuan.9  With the 
5growing numbers of people who have lost their former jobs, it is not surprising that by early 
2000, 73 percent of China's urban populaton had incomes below the national average and just 27 
percent were above it, according to a study done in 11 major cities by the Macroeconomic 
Research Institute of the State Planning Commission.10 
 
The startling thing is that these demeaned menials making up the crowd today are city-born and -
registered citizens, members of the once celebrated factory proletariat, turned now into the cohort 
of the xiagang,11 and not second-class inmigrating peasants, who had held such posts just a few 
years back.12  In illustration of this crumpling of status hierarchies, the term "mingong,"--loosely, 
a label used to specify casual labor, which in the recent past was employed just to refer to surplus 
rural workers from the interior--in 1998 began to designate the urban laid-off and unemployed as 
well.13 
 
These newly informalized drudges and displaced members of the sometime city-based 
proletariat--combined with their position with respect to and their treatment by the state--stand as 
a powerful symbol of what has shifted and what has not in the stance and behavior of the 
"people's" government in the PRC today, as compared with its Maoist predecessor.  The image of 
"the crowd" can serve as a wonderful vehicle for presenting this transformation, of the workers 
and of their relational bond, both among themselves and with their state.  In this talk, I first 
conjure up continuities and contrasting visions between today's and yesterday's crowds and their 
respective connections to the state.  I then supply some empirical material about the constituent 
members of this urban crowd and how they are affected by current state policies. 
 
The Crowd in People's China:  Continuities and Contrasts 
Just as the crowd--the masses--in Mao's time inspired awe--by its huge, unfathomable numbers, 
its eerie internal conformity, and its ostensibly unstoppable vigor--so in the present, untold 
millions are, once again, all engaging in similar activity, for seemingly endless stretches of time.  
If the awe felt by the viewer of the crowd of yore was inspired by that crowd's apparent passion, 
though, the spectator's wonder now is more a result of pathos.  For where the earlier crowd, its 
6members unified in collaboration, was allegedly accomplishing miracles, the crowd before us 
now is composed of people struggling, usually singly, to stay alive.   
 
According to Elias Canetti, in his book, Crowds and Power, equality is one of the four chief 
attributes of the generic crowd.14 And indeed, in both cases, though in disparate ways and for 
very different reasons (both times having much to do with the posture of the government), the 
respective crowds' components are equals.  For those in each are, respectively, fairly 
homogeneously affected by the state and thus react comparably.  And the plight of both crowds' 
members could be seen as the same in still one more regard:  their situations are largely 
involuntarily constituted, coerced, if to varying degrees and in quite differing ways. 
 
And yet the chasm between the two mammoth hordes is deep, reflecting a sea change in the 
state's choice of social coalition and its vastly altered ambitions.  Under Mao's reign, municipal 
workers--the urban mass's members were "masters," in name and in privilege, and the masses of 
rural peasants their purported partners.  Both the workers and the peasants--when officially 
mobilized--comprised the regime's only, or, surely, most legitimate political actors, agents, if you 
will, without much volition.  But in that state supposedly based upon the lower classes, the 
formal social status of the crowd was high, and to be a part of it meant one stood as decidedly 
included within the ranks of the renowned.   
 
As historical actors, when stirred into motion, these Maoist partisans were a rapidly moving and 
mighty force with fearsome power.  For Canetti, this would be the "baiting crowd," which "forms 
with reference to a quickly attainable goal," toward which it heads "with unique determination."  
It "has speed, elation, conviction."  For the Chinese masses in the days of socialism, though, 
these traits were increasingly merely feigned, with time.  Canetti also notes that, "the [baiting] 
crowd have [sic.] immense superiority on their side."  This in the Mao-era Chinese case was 
because of the features noted just above.15  These actors were known to perpetrate such marvels 
as to spark a prairie fire, stage a revolution, reshape the structure of ownership of agricultural 
land, appropriate for the state the wealth of the bourgeoisie, forge steel in the fields while 
7surpassing all prior grain growth targets, and surge through the streets in the persons of Red 
Guards, wantonly deposing and shaming all their superiors.   
 
In stark opposition to that visage of potency, the crowdspeople of today in the cities are the 
xiagang, off-post or laid-off workers.  One man out of work offered his observation, one not 
wholly without foundation:  "Zaiyede hen shao, gongren chabuduo yiban dou xiagangle" [Those 
still at work are very few, about half the workers have been laid off].16 These folk are perceptibly 
slowed down today, as against their robust style in the past, and pretty impotent, in the face of the 
regime's switch of alliance away from the poorer, and its recasting of status in favor of those with 
capital, technical know-how, and the means of easily acquiring more of both of these goods.  To 
be a constituent of this present crowd, then, is to be among the excluded, the abandoned.   
 
Where the old, secure, entitled, full-time proletariat was agent, this set of part-time or overtime 
informalites is victim;  where the former was wound up by the Party, the latter has been 
unwound, undone by it.  These people correspond to Canetti's "flight crowd," which is "created 
by a threat," in this case the threat of perishing from hunger or from untreated illness.  He 
explains that "the same danger faces them all."  Such a crowd could become a panic, should mass 
flight turn into a "struggle of each against all who stand in its way."17  While the first was the 
protagonist in earth-shaking mass movements at home, the second is reject in a sort of immobile 
mass stasis (in Canetti's terms, these are, respectively, the "rhythmic crowd," for which 
"everything depends on movement," and the "stagnating crowd")18, or, at best, pawn in the 
leadership (in league with foreign investors)'s grand project of global ascent.   
 
Moreover, while the crowd of the past was a united body, an internally relatively uniform 
aggregation that worked in unison, that mass has been dismantled and disaggregated, atomized in 
its action first into families by the household responsibility system in the countryside, which cut 
up the commune around 1980.  These family units, in turn, were further carved up into individual 
actors with the state's permission to migrate, which created a population of "floaters," and by the 
state's license to launch private businesses just a few years later.  Many, many others in the urban 
8crowd were since the late 1990's tossed from their workposts, their collective units [danwei], one 
by one. 
 
So as this very brief comparison highlights, the modalities of the crowd in China have both 
changed and not changed.  But what we can say by way of summary is that, in myriad ways, the 
crowd provides an image, whether of a mob or a herd churned into agitation by political 
campaigns, or of people in multitudes chased from their workplaces as accounts run dry and 
plants collapse.  Whatever happens, so far the components of the Chinese crowd at any given 
point (if viewed as the majority of the population at that particular time and place) greatly 
resemble each other. At the same time they reveal in their features, and in their forms and manner 
of dynamism, the program, the direction, and the aims of the state at that juncture.  We turn now 
to a closer look at the urban crowd in the age of efficiency and flexible labor.   
 
The Urban Crowd Today:  A Glance at Some Statistics 
According to a mid-1999 report, some government officials believe the real number of workers 
who should be counted as unemployed--including all those currently labelled "as waiting for 
work" but not included in the unemployed statistics--could be as high as 100 million.19 In their 
current guise as informal laborers, these people constitute a largely unstudied component of the 
transition to capitalism in China, a blight on that rosiness of reform with its supposed rising 
prosperity that one often hears about.20 
 
It is literally impossible to offer a true reckoning of the numbers of laid-off labor in China during 
the mid- and late 1990's.  A review of some of the statistics announced over the past few years is 
sure to confuse the analyst.  For instance, in early 2000, one journal article asserted that 5.64 
million state workers had been laid off or diverted in 1995, 8.9 in 1996, 9.4 million in 1997, plus 
an additional 6.1 million in 1998 (or a total of 30 million).21  But another article in a different 
journal noted that in 1998 and 1999 combined, there was a total of 24.28 million xiagang 
workers, a figure reached by adding the 12.54 it said were laid off in 1998 (i. e., twice the figure 
cited in the first piece) to 11.74 in 1999.  Yet, most puzzling, it then goes on to announce that in 
1998, 5.62 million had joined this pool, plus another 5.64 million in 1999.22   
9Official statistics on "reemployment" are similarly slippery.  One might be suspicious when even 
those who compile these figures have to admit, as one did in Wuhan, that, "One can't be clear 
about these statistics;  they're relative, not absolute.  The situation is dynamic and there's no way 
to count them [..shuobuqing ..xiangduide..meibanfa tongji].23  According to this official, who 
cited a percentage of about 30 percent reemployed in Wuhan, it is the numbers of positions 
known to be newly filled [renci], and not the number of people with new jobs, that is counted up 
once each month, and each year these figures are added up, eliminating from the total the jobs 
that are known to labor administrators to have ended.  These figures certainly involve counting 
the same person--who may have held several very short-term posts that year--more than once.   
 
In addition to this vagueness about how to tally the reemployed, there are wide variations in 
official announcements about their proportions among the laid-off.  One article in an internal 
publication cited a miserable rate of just 27 percent nationwide who had found new placements 
as of the end of June 1999.24  An open official pronouncement asserted that a late 1990's study of 
10,000 laid-off workers in 10 cities showed that as many as 68 percent of those with new jobs 
had held these jobs for just six months or less, including 40 percent of the total who did so for 
under three months.  A mere 17.26 percent managed to hold onto their new post for longer than a 
year.25 And after surveying 160 firms in 16 cities in August 1999, a research group from the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions found that the reemployment rate in most provinces fell 
between 20 and 40 percent.26   
 
Another cause for concern about the numbers is the amount of time people are spending out of 
work:  In Hubei province, a September 1997 random sampling of 3,000 laid-off workers in 580 
firms in 10 cities and counties revealed that, although 47 percent were said to be reemployed, as 
many as another 26 percent had already been without employment for three years or more, while 
only 29 percent had been in that situation for less than a year.27   
 
Not only were so many languishing laborless, but the occupations they took up if they did find 
work were most unpromising.  According to this same study, 18.6 percent had turned into odd-
job manual workers, 10 percent did various sorts of hourly work (which usually refers to 
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activities such as picking up others' children from school);  5.2 percent had seasonal jobs;  60 
percent were individual retailers operating stalls;  and a mere 6.8 percent had obtained formal, 
contracted employment.  Among the stallkeepers, a worrisome 45 percent were discovered to be 
working as vulnerable, mobile peddlers, selling in shifting sites without a license.28 Other 
research in 1997 among 360 reeemployed staff and workers in Wuhan found that over a third of 
them (34.54 percent) had set up a stall, were operating a pedicab or driving a taxi;  by autumn 
2000, a pedicab jockey claimed in private conversation that he had a startling 26,000 competitors 
in his trade in the city!29  If there is any accuracy at all in such a sum, it is not surprising that the 
streets of the city are crammed with a crowd of men pedaling their empty carts, and that their 
daily take is tiny. 
 
The State Abandons its Former Coalition Partner and the Nature of the Resulting 
Informalization 
Despite appearances, this deregulated economic activity does not represent just a straightforward 
manifestation of the metamorphosis of the Chinese urban economy, some uncomplicated 
consequence of that system's steadily deepening marketization.  Nor do these sellers merely 
symbolize an instance of the widespread process of privatization30 that is attending the advance 
of capitalism on a global scale.31  It is also inappropriate to view their labor as the latest 
incarnation of the secondary sector of China's longstanding "dual market," as if a market, 
operating according to principles of supply and demand, had merely become bifurcated along 
some new fault line.32 
 
What is usually billed as the "secondary economy" across the world is a sector comprised of 
marginal and/or denigrated people, usually migrants or minorities, who have been relegated to 
the least desirable and most unstable work available.  Their lives, however, no matter how bitter, 
have generally improved significantly in material terms as a result of having joined such markets, 
as compared with what their existence was like before.33 But as distinct from the usual secondary 
market worker elsewhere, these laid-off Chinese workers are downwardly, not upwardly, mobile.   
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Furthermore, unlike informalites in other places, the urban people on Chinese streets today are 
not situated in this niche voluntarily in order to build businesses or to amass capital.  Rather, they 
have found themselves in this spot because their former rice bowl was snatched away, and for 
them there is no other means of survival.  Since most of these small-time sellers of odd 
merchandise and manual labor were until recently full-time, life-tenured, completely welfare-
entitled and state-employed manufacturing workers, one needs to go beyond the surface signs of 
their quotidian practices--their superficial appearance as a reborn "private sector" linked to 
economic "reform" in the urban areas--to get a good grasp of what is going on.34  
 
In understanding their condition, one is also led astray by official formulations aimed at enticing 
urban residents into the new tertiary or private sectors.  In 1999 the National People's Congress 
amended the state constitution, proclaiming the private sector a "component part" of the national 
economy.  A hopeful sign appeared to be the expanding portion of the national economy 
occupied by this branch:  in spring 1999, the State Economic and Trade Commission announced 
that "private enterprises" were accounting for almost one fifth of the gross value of industrial 
output nationally and for a full 37 percent of the retail trade in consumer goods,35 figures that are 
probably much lower than the reality.  Despite these promising bits of information, however, a 
report on the sector admonished--in an analysis which still holds true--most practitioners in the 
private sector are seriously constrained by a lack of funding channels.36 In the especially stricken 
northeast, people attempting to open their own businesses are unable to obtain any government 
support for their little ventures, and have been heavily taxed.37   
 
The predicament of these people is by no means a product of "the market" acting alone.  Instead, 
it derives mainly from state policies.  Indeed, in the second half of the 1990's, the Chinese state 
adopted a set of new policies quite unrestrained by the nature of the social coalition that had 
formerly buttressed its rule:  it abandoned its putative past political partner, the working class, 
quite callously, in a step it has disingenuously justified as being in labor's own "long-term 
interest."38  Just as the sacking campaign was getting underway in force, the 1997 May Day 
editorial in the Party paper, the People's Daily, admonished its readers that, "It's possible benefits 
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of some workers may be temporarily affected.  Seen from long-term benefits, the pains are worth 
enduring."39 
 
Ironically enough, in its march toward modernization and economic reform, even as the Chinese 
leadership has unleashed and encouraged the forces of the market, at the same time it has arrested 
the full unfolding of some of the chief social processes that generally emerge from marketization 
elsewhere.  Thus in China, instead of the advancing affluence, rising levels of education, and 
embourgeoisment of a large section of the working class that took place in many societies along 
with economic development--and quite markedly so in China's East Asian neighbors, South 
Korea, Japan and Taiwan--this informalization of the urban economy represents a regression, not 
an ascent, for quite a numerous portion of the urban populace.   
 
Thus, there has not really ensued in urban China the shift in the principle of social stratification 
from status to class that some imagine to be underway.  Though one could label these newly 
jobless members of a lower class in formation, their situation is now defined and shaped much 
more by their status as xiagang workers than by some new class category.  For this group of 
people, chiefly of middle age, have together and all at once fallen onto a downward trajectory in 
their livestyles and in their prospects.   
 
The overwhelming majority of them were deprived of formal education from having been 
compelled to quit school and join in the Cultural Revolution (including, for most, a lengthy stint 
in the countryside) over a decade or so after 1966, and therefore lack any skills.  Study after study 
more or less replicates the findings of sample research done in 1996 nationwide by the State 
Statistical Bureau.  That inquiry discovered that as many as 57 percent of those laid off had been 
educated only up to junior high level;  another 14 percent had received just a primary school 
education or even less.  As many as 70.4 percent were between the ages of 25 and 44, while 
another 18.5 percent were over 45.  Women accounted for a total of 64.3 percent of the sample, 
though they represented under half the workforce before the sackings started.40 
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True, with the demise of the planned economy, economic forces have played an important role in 
changing society.  For one thing, they have surely infringed on state institutions' old monopoly on 
shaping people's fates.  And there has certainly been a diminution in the determining power over 
urbanites' lives of specific institutions such as the danwei [work unit].41  But this move away 
from planning, with its  shunting aside of the former urban workforce, has not, unlike 
marketization in other settings, eventuated in any meangingful autonomy for most members of 
this contingent, as some have predicted.42   
 
The state's project of marketization is evolving distinctively in yet another way.  To a large extent 
the emerging labor market lacks true demand-driven economic activity, at least insofar as the 
work done by the furloughed is concerned.  This is the case because, given the immense 
proportions of the official program of enforced dismissals, plus the unspecialized nature of the 
labor the affected workers have to offer, there cannot be demand sufficient to forge a decent 
livelihood for the millions made redundant, now struggling to find takers for their wares and their 
services.   
 
So the Chinese leadership has fostered a novel style of economic growth and development, one 
that entails sacrificing and discarding the very working class that once laid the foundation for the 
present rise to prosperity.  In short, in the state's very rush to reform its municipal economy, most 
of marketization's typical social concomitants have been suppressed or halted for many.  This is 
especially ironic as the state's mouthpieces propound the virtues of "the market," when what 
politicians have produced is a market so heavily influenced by statist measures.  It is the statist 
measures, and not economic forces by themselves, that have engendered the present surge of 
unemployment.  So this street activity I have described is the outcome not so much of 
marketization per se.  Rather, it is much more the result of a fundamental reconstruction 
underway of the liaison between the state and its former premier workforce.   
 
For more than 40 years, the Chinese state and its elite laborers, the workers at the urban state-
owned enterprises (SOE's), enjoyed a relationship that was multifacted, to be sure.  But at its core 
this tie embodied a strong dose of paternalistic protection, of succor, albeit one laced with 
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surveillance.  As is well known, workers labored under a reign of "organized dependency,"43 in 
which plant leaders could generally consider themselves to be caretakers--for the employees--but 
for the state as well, under whose commission managers controlled their charges.  In prosaic 
terms, factory officials were there to administer the daily business of production and workers' 
welfare.  But in a larger sense they were joined with the Chinese state in enacting a role of 
benefactor as well as guardian, if a very intrusive one. 
 
Now all that has changed in the space of just a few short years.  Increasingly as the last century 
came to a close, the nature of this once often benign connection turned sour.  With the sudden 
surge in shedding state workers after 1995 that had already seen a start in the late 1980's, the key 
component of the linkage between state and this laboring segment of society has become fear, a 
searing dread on both sides.  At the same time, many of the one-time intermediaries standing 
between them, the plant officials--especially those in the failing firms--have shucked off their 
pose of custodian and taken on that of embezzler, thereby no longer serving either the central 
state (except insofar as they obey orders from above to push the workers from their plants) or 
their original worker-wards.   
 
Thus the more or less clear line of command and superintendence of old--along which 
management acted toward labor as the agent of the center, which was its principal, directing 
production and disbursing benefits--has been deflected, such that the three parties (state, 
enterprise administrators, workers), once supposed allies, have become mutually antagonistic.  
Now in the relation between state and this recast lower portion of society, the state's moves are 
motivated primarily by its fear (though probably also, at least for some among its staffers, by 
guilt), as it abandons its prior roles, along with its prior proteges.  At the same time, the workers, 
in turn, experience despair mixed with their fear, and, in a growing proportion of cases, 
embitterment and daring.  This is the mid-term inter-echelon and inter-personal dynamic that is 
developing with the informalization of the urban economy, as the process transforms a crowd of 
once so-styled "masters" into one of paupers.   
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The upshot is that the state and its rulers have fallen captive to an increasingly pronounced 
paradox in the trio of their stated aims--reform, development, and stability:  While the leaders 
strive to develop the economy through market reforms, they must balance a treacherous trade-off 
between their objectives of growth and marketization, which, in their version, has meant massive 
discharges, and the creator of a new crowd of the dispossessed, on the one hand, and a resultant 
and mounting social instability among these recently disenfranchised, on the other.  More, 
intimidation is evident among both parties--the state alternatively in its offering (or at least 
promising) favors and funds, or battling and jailing dissidents, and many workers either 
retreating into a crushed quiesence or exhausting themselves with full-time income-seeking.   
 
Conclusion 
This material demonstrates that in China today--where rampant economic reforming and 
enterprise dismantling is decimating a great proportion of the old state sector and the crowd it 
sustained for decades--unemployment means much more than being out of work on an individual 
level.  Rather, it is serving as the prelude to a collective and sudden informalization of the urban 
economy, a reforging of a crowd once ennobled and proud into a new crowd, one cowering and 
declasse.  The current condition of the past proletariat is not just a matter of some people taking 
up private sectoral jobs as the economy marketizes;  nor is their new niche, as it is promoted and 
sometimes assisted by the government, a typical second economy.   
 
So formal Chinese workers, dignified and advantaged for decades, became idle or informal ones 
in the late 1990's.  In the place of the miraculous world of the crowd of yore, we see instead a 
grim and lackluster one of the undistinguished masses, those let go by their firms.  In the altered 
social status hierarchy in the making in Chinese cities, to be a laborer is lowly, not lordly, as it 
had been not so long ago.  There is, too, quite a transformed tie between the state and its one-
time working class, now the new crowd, a bond lately characterized much more by mutual fear 
and shame than by the original socialists' shared and cooperative mission of constructing, with 
and through their honored crowd, a more fair and egalitarian China. 
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